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                                                                               ABSTRACT 
In most resource-driven developing economies, a mineral-based formal sector and an informal 
resource sector (such as charcoal production) constitute the main economic activities, from which 
local dwellers derive their livelihoods. The paper examines the coexistence of formal and informal 
resource sectors in resource-dependent economies, whose production depend on an exhaustible 
(e.g.  minerals)  and  a  renewable  resource  stock  (e.g.  forest)  respectively.  We  examine  the 
implications of declining mineral stocks on public revenues, labour movements between sectors,  
and economic growth in an attempt to elucidate the poor economic performance of most mineral-
dependent countries. Decreasing mineral stocks induce a relocation of labour towards informal 
production,  and  deprive  local  authorities  from  public  revenues  collected  within  the  formal 
economy.  This  constrains  the  ability  to  improve  infrastructure  and  welfare  over  time  and 
simultaneously imposes pressure on the local environment through deforestation. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Mineral-based  economic  development  has  not  proven  to  be  a  successful  strategy  amongst 
developing  nations  in  recent  years.  On  the  contrary  mineral-rich  countries  in  general 
underperformed in terms of economic growth over the last three decades; a tendency that became 
renowned  as  the  ‘resource  curse  hypothesis’.  In  this  paper,  we  attempt  to  provide  a  novel 
theoretical mechanism that can further elucidate this paradoxical relationship. The analysis focuses 
on  the  implications  of  declining  mineral  stocks  on  infrastructure  and  labour  movements,  and 
thereof  on  economic  development.  In  most  resource-driven  developing  economies,  mineral 
extraction  and  an  informal  resource  sector  (such  as  charcoal  production)  constitute  the  main 
economic activities, from which local dwellers derive their livelihood. A dissipating mineral stock 
induces a relocation of labour towards informal production, depriving the local authorities from 
public revenues collected within the formal economy. This is related to the fact that activities 
alternative to mining are most of the time unofficial, hard to monitor and therefore not subject to 
taxation.  This  constrains  the  ability  to  increase  labour  productivity  and  welfare  over  time  by 
investing  such  public  revenues  towards  improving  infrastructure  and  carrying  out  educational 
projects.  
           Furthermore, informal activities related to looting common natural resources will directly 
depend on the performance of the formal mineral-based sector. A contracting mineral-dependent 
sector will induce a continuous entry of workers towards informal resource activities and will exert 
a downward pressure on the renewable resource stocks.  
            Regions  in  China  and  Zambia  have  suffered  in  recent  years  either  from  the  closure  or 
underperformance of local mines resulting in soaring unemployment, an expansion of the informal 
sector and a loss of public taxes. To a large extent, this has been the result of weak initiative by 
local authorities and policymakers to stimulate alternative economic activities and assist the mine 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent empirical evidence and theoretical work provide strong support to a resource curse 
hypothesis; i.e. natural wealth tends to retard rather than promote economic growth (Auty 
1994, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, 2007, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 
Rodriguez and Sachs 1999, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b). The 
OPEC  countries  experienced  a  disappointing  annual  growth  rate  of  –1.3%  on  average 
between 1965-1998 despite the significant injections of petrodollars into their local economies 
from  the  oil  extractive  industries  (Gylfason  2001a).  The  expectations  of  many  early 
development  economists  (Nurkse  1953,  Rostow  1960,  Watkins  1963)  that  resource 
endowments could potentially support economic expansion by attracting funds from foreign 
creditors,  channelling  the  primary  sector  rents  into  productive  investments  and  escaping 
“poverty  traps”  proved  to  be  wrong.  Similarly,  any  positive  linkages  between  resource 
abundance and economic prosperity observed during the origins of the industrial revolution in 
Great Britain, Germany and the U.S. or more recently in countries, such as Botswana, Norway 
and Iceland appear to be exceptional cases rather than belong to a general applicable rule 
(Sachs and Warner 1995, Wright 1990).  
  Our  analysis  attempts  to  shed  some  additional  light  into  this  paradoxical  relationship 
between  resource  dependence  and  economic  performance.  We  purposely  explore  the 
implications of a coexistence of formal and informal activities on economic development for 
resource-dependent economies, in order to obtain additional insights into this direction. We 
expose how a stagnated mining sector can have broader repercussions in terms of welfare. A 
mining sector in recession may induce labour shifts into other informal economic activities. In 
developing  countries  such  activities  often  involve  informal  looting  of  common  resources 
resulting for instance in deforestation or overfishing. As a consequence, there are immediate  
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negative  repercussions  in  terms  of  environmental  degradation  and  the  capacity  to  collect 
public revenues and reinvest them into welfare-improving infrastructure or education.  
Evidence from several under-developed regions around the world with stagnated mining 
sectors provides support to our theoretical analysis. In a recent paper, Andrews-Speed et al. 
(2005), argue that the gradual closure of several coal mines in the Chongqing Municipality in 
south-west China resulted to a large extent in increased unemployment and failure to absorb 
ex-miners in other formal economic activities. Between 1998 and 2000 alone, more than 3000 
small-scale coal mines were closed in the municipality, with employment in the mining sector 
decreasing  by  56%  and  40%  in  the  Yubei  and  Yongchuan  counties  respectively.  Mineral 
output also fell by more than 30% for the two countries in the same period. In years when coal 
mines performed well, there was little initiative to stimulate alternative economic activities 
(“alternative  livelihoods”)  and  assist  the  mine  employees  to  gradually  develop  new  skills 
(Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development, 2002, Labonne 2003).  
In general, mineral prices tend to be volatile, the grade of ore extracted deteriorates over 
time and good days do not last forever. When those most profitable deposits are extracted and 
world mineral prices decline, local mines struggle to operate profits and unemployed mine 
employees  become  forced  to  derive  their  livelihoods  from  informal  sectors  (Rocha  and 
Bristow,  1997).  The  same  pattern  has  been  recently  widely  observed  in  Eastern  Europe 
(Russia,  Romania  and  Ukraine),  where  stagnated  mining  sectors  led  to  an  expansion  of 
informal activities (Haney and Shkaratan, 2003). The share of the informal sector in non-
agricultural GDP is larger than 50% in many mineral-dependent economies, as it is the case 
for Cameroon, Togo, and Peru (International Labour Organization 2002).  Local governments 
rely on tax revenues from mining operations to carry out any infrastructure projects that may 
improve  local  livelihoods  (Andrews-Speed  et  al.  2005).  Stagnated  mining  sectors  will 
obviously impact negatively on the capability of local governments to collect public revenues  
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and channel them into productive activities (such as electrification, construction of motorways 
or improving telecommunication systems).   
A similar dismal situation has also been recently observed in the Copperbelt region in 
Zambia; a country considered as one of the most notorious manifestations of the resource-
curse with an average annual rate of –4% over the last four decades. The Zambian economy 
has  been  dominated  for  years  by  its  copper  industry  and  as  Berger  (1974)  argues  local 
administrators  continuously  prayed  for  the  mineral  windfall  to  help  finance  development. 
With many mines already having achieved their maximum productive capacity and volatile 
copper prices, governments had been unwilling to reduce dependence on copper and more 
wasteful resource were ultimately pumped into the mining sector rather than other alternative 
sectors (for an elabourate discussion, see Roberts, 1976). With unstable copper prices and the 
high-grade  ores  already  extracted,  large  numbers  of  miners  have  been  laid  off  from  the 
mines
2. With a lack of other formal activities to absorb excessive unemployment, most ex-
miners  were  forced  to  make  their  living  out  of  the  area’s  natural  resources;  mainly  by 
engaging in the informal charcoal sector. The expansion of such informal activities related to 
looting  the  local  resource  base  exert  pressure  on  the  local  environment.  The  dissipating 
mineral stock used in formal output and the related outflow of work towards the informal 
sector constrain the ability of local authorities to collect tax revenues (to finance any activities 
with a direct effect on labour productivity). The extent of deforestation (estimated to 50,000 
hectares annually around the town of Kitwe in the Copperbelt region alone) and its connection 
with the failure of formal sectors to create employment in Zambia is well documented in 
Kalumiana (1997) and Sibande (1996). 
                                                   
2 For instance, the global mining giant Anglo American pulled out of Zambia in 2002 and the closure of its mines 




In Section 2 we develop our formal analysis, where individuals derive their livelihood 
either  from  mining  or  from  informal  activities.  Section  2.1  describes  the  formal  mineral-
dependent  sector,  where  the  dissipation  of  the  non-renewable  resource  input  constraints 
production.  Section  2.2.  introduces  the  informal  renewable  resource  sector,  where  local 
dwellers can alternatively direct their work effort. Local authorities invest in infrastructure 
collecting public revenues by taxing the economy’s formal output. In Section 2.3, we derive 
the dynamic equilibrium and main propositions linking mining underperformance to increases 
in  informal  activities  (such  as  tree-cutting  for  charcoal)  and  income  contraction.  Finally, 
section 3 concludes. 
2.   MODEL SET UP 
In this section we analyse our main model, describing the coexistence of formal and informal 
resource  dependent  sector,  where  individuals  can  direct  their  work  effort.  We  choose  to 
analyse such a set-up, as it bears close resemblance to the economic reality that the majority 
of workers faces in many resource-dependent regions in the developing world. We assume 
that the formal sector is dominated by the mining industry, while workers can alternatively 
derive their livelihood by engaging in informal activities, e.g. by harvesting wood for charcoal 
production (as in the Copperbelt region in Zambia). Infrastructure used in the formal economy 
is financed by taxes on the mineral-dependent output. A dissipating mineral stock offloads 
labour to the informal sector and, thus, restricts the government’s potential to collect public 
revenues. Such a contraction of formal economic activities directly hampers the potential of 
the  local  economy  to  improve  intertemporally  the  level  of  welfare.  Furthermore,  such  an 
outflow of labour out of the formal sector exerts a continuous downward pressure on the 




2.1. The Formal Mineral-Dependent Economy  
  We  assume  that  the  economy  consists  of  identical  agents,  whose  population  remains 
constant at each point in time. We normalise population size to unity and assume that each 
individual  allocates  her  work  effort  between  two  economic  activities.    We  assume  that  a 
proportion (1–γ) of overall work effort is devoted to formal production, which comprises of 
activities dependent on a depletable mineral resource. The rest of the representative agent’s 
work  effort  involves  engagement  into  activities  that  take  place  mostly  informally  in  the 
economy, such as deforestation and charcoal burning.
3 Therefore, the level of formal labour 
input LY(t) in the economy is determined by 
LY(t) = (1–γ(t)).  (1) 
For  the  rest  of  the  analysis,  we  will  omit  any  time  references,  unless  there  is  need  for 
clarification. 
  Labour  moves  freely  between  the  mining-dependent  sector  and  informal  (charcoal) 
production, as the predominant sectors in a resource-dependent economy, where individuals 
can seek employment. We assume there is a formal mining sector combining formal labour 
(1–γ),  infrastructure  A  (which  can  be  conceived  also  as  human  capital  or  the  stock  of 
knowledge), as well as a non-renewable mineral resource E. We assume production in the 
mining sector (Y) takes place with constant returns to scale with respect to its inputs, namely 








 β<1 and α+β<1.
 4  (2) 
                                                   
3   Alternatively, one may conceive the share (1–γ) as the proportion of employees (in terms of the total work 
force) engaged into mining. 
4   We normalise the price of formal output to unity. Later on, we introduce a price for the produce of the 
renewable-resource sector, which will reflect relative prices between the two sectors.  
 
8 
  Firms in the mining sector choose the level of  inputs that maximise their profits and 
production factors are paid their marginal products. The prices of labour, infrastructure, and 
resource  input  are  denoted  by  w,  PA  and  PE  respectively.  Thus,  firms  face  the  following 
maximisation problem, 
E P A P w E A E A
K N - - - - -
- -
-
) 1 ( ) 1 ( max
1
, ) 1 (
g g
b a b a
g . 
 
The first order conditions imply that firms in the formal sector face the following demand for 
labour, physical capital and mineral resources: 
    w = βA
α (1–γ)
β-1E












  We assume that the government collects taxes levied on formal output using a constant 
tax rate τ (this will obviously decrease all returns accruing to production factors, as suggested 
by equations (3)-(5), by (1- τ) as well).
5 As in Torvik (2002), only the formal sector is subject 
to  taxation;  for  instance  activities  such  as  charcoal  burning  and  logging  often  take  place 
informally in developing countries, and are in essence unmonitored unregulated activities, and 
as such not subject to taxation. On the other hand, a sophisticated system of taxation (through 
royalties and export or income taxes) provides to the government a large share of the value of 
mining production (e.g. see Harvey 1972 for a discussion).The government directs all tax  
 
9 
payments to finance the level of infrastructure used in production A.
6 This can be thought of 
as necessary labour skills, educational standards, infrastructure or technologies in use. For 
instance,  the  government  may  use  tax  payments  to  improve  the  work-related  knowledge, 
finance research, import technologies, or develop a reliable transportation system.
7 Thus, we 
have
8: 
Y A t = .  (6) 
 
In order to achieve improvements in living standards over time, governments are expected 
to take initiatives in that direction. Ministries support projects that involve improvements in 
education,  health,  telecommunication  systems,  electrification,  and  many  kinds  of 
infrastructure development that enhance labour productivity. Such initiatives involve high set-
up costs and benefits that accrue to broad layers of the society. Therefore, private enterprises 
have a low incentive to undertake such projects, since they do not reap directly such social 
benefits. Especially in the developing world (where private entrepreneurship plays a minor 
role) the responsibility of government is vital in financing such initiatives through taxation. In 
that respect, development projects funded through public revenues are decisive in targeting 
poverty  and  achieving  welfare  progress
9.  A  decrease  in  the  level  of  formal  production 
                                                                                                                                                               
5   The model essentially assumes that all income accruing from the formal and informal sectors after taxes are 
paid, is consumed within the economy by workers in both sectors, the mine owners and the government. 
6   For a similar productivity growth mechanism, where infrastructure accumulation is financed by taxes on 
output, see Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). 
7   Assuming that the government would acquire all mining revenues and distribute a share of them as inputs’ 
payments would lead to similar conclusions.  In that respect, we abstract from the nature of mining ownership. 
8   A dot over a variable will denote its derivative over time. 
9   Saying that, there is an extensive literature on how governments in resource-abundant countries misuse 
resource revenues (Baland and Francois (2000), Ross (2001)). Although issues of corruption and rent-seeking are 
not the focal point in our analysis (implicitly assuming a benevolent governmental body utilizing mining taxes) 
we recognise that often mismanagement is widespread. Assuming that government officials appropriate either a  
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Let us assume that there is an initial non-renewable mineral stock, and that the use of 
mineral input at  each point contributes to mineral stock depletion. Therefore, the mineral 
stock R dissipates according to the following differential equation: 
E R - = & .  (7) 
We will assume that a constant fraction δ of the mineral stock is used in production at each 
point  in  time,  which  is  a  standard  assumption  in  general  equilibrium  models  of  optimal 
extraction  paths  for  non-renewable  resources  (for  a  rigorous  exposition  see  Dasgupta  and 
Heal, 1974, and for a similar analysis in growth modelling see Jones, 2002 and Romer, 2006). 
This implies that the depletion rate of the mineral stock is equal to –δ, and since the amount of 
mineral input used in production E is a share δ of the mineral stock, mineral input E will 
follow a similar negative exponential growth. In other words: 
d - = - = = R E R R gR / / & , and  (8) 
d - = = = E E g g R E / & ,  (9) 
where gR and gE denote the growth rates of the mineral stock and input respectively.  
                                                                                                                                                               
proportion of mining revenues or public taxes, would reduce the funds invested in infrastructure, as described by 
equation (6).   
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2.2. The Informal Sector 
We  assume  there  is  an  informal  sector  (e.g.  charcoal  production)  coexisting  with  mining 
activities, where individuals can alternatively direct their work effort.
10 As it is standard in the 
environmental economics literature of renewable resources, we assume a simple quadratic 
natural-reproduction specification of a regenerative resource X (for an elaborate discussion on 
growth functions of renewable resources, see Dasgupta and Heal 1979, Dasgupta 1982, and 
Lotka 1956).
11  
2 ) ( X X X F - = .  (10) 
We  also  assume  that  the  harvest  H  of  the  renewable  resource  depends  positively  on  the 
resource  stock  X  and  the  work  effort  devoted  to  it  (the  share  γ  of  the  labour  effort  not 
allocated to formal activities). We assume a simple linear harvest function, as used in Clark 
1985, and Conrad and Clark, 1987: 
X X H g g = ) , ( .  (11) 
The  evolution  of  the  renewable  resource  stock  over  time  will  depend  on  the  difference 
between its regenerative capacity and harvest, as given by (10) and (11)
12. In other words, 
) , ( ) ( g X H X F X - = & .  (12) 
                                                   
10   Since our focus is mainly on labour movements, we assume that all physical capital is employed in the 
mining sector. This is not an unrealistic assumption to the extent that mining remains capital-intensive relative 
for instance to informal charcoal production. 
11   More complicated functions, such as a Schaeffer or Gompertz function, could be used (see Conrad and 
Clark, 1987). We stick to our simple quadratic formula, as it simplifies the model dynamics while preserving the 
main assumption a strictly concave biological growth path. 
12   See Conrad and Clark (1987), Dasgupta and Heal (1979), and, Dasgupta (1982).  
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From  equations  (10),  (11)  and  (12),  we  can  derive  a  sustainable  harvest  functional  form, 
where the harvest rate becomes equal to the natural rate of reproduction, as given by (11) and 
(12) respectively. 
X X H X F X = - ⇒ = - = g g 1 0 ) , ( ) ( & .  (13) 
The stationary ‘sustainable’ point implied by (13) is a stable equilibrium. If resource harvest 
H  exceeds  resource  reproduction  F  for  given  work  effort  γ,  the  resource  stock  will  start 
decreasing ( 0 < X & ), until the two equalise.  When resource harvest H falls short of resource 
reproduction  F,  the  resource  stock  will  start  increasing  till  it  reaches  again  the  stationary 
sustainable level. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Individuals direct their work effort towards the sector offering higher payoffs per person. In 
the informal sector, we assume that agents share the renewable resource revenues PXH(γ,X), 
where  PX  is  the  price  of  the  renewable  resource.  Therefore,  revenues  per  worker  in  the 
informal sector are equal to: 
PXH(γ,X)/γ = PX X.  (14) 
Labour will shift between sectors, in order that the return to work effort equalises between 
formal and informal activities. This labour arbitrage will result in renewable revenues per 
person (as in equation (14)) becoming equal to formal wages after taxes are paid (equation 
(3) adjusted for taxes paid on formal production): 
    w(1-τ) = βA
α (1–γ)
β-1E
1-α-β = PxX,  (15)  
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Combining  equations  (13)  and  (15),  labour  arbitrage  and  population  dynamics  for  the 
renewable sector provide us with the following equation: 
  (1-τ) βA
α (1–γ)
β-1E
1-α-β = Px(1–γ).  (16) 
 
2.3. Dynamic Equilibrium 
  From the production function in the formal sector (equation (2)) and taking into account 
the depletion of the mineral stock (equation (9)), we can calculate the growth rate of formal 
production: 
d b g g b a ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( / / - - - - - + = =
×
a A A Y Y gY & &   (17) 
From the labour arbitrage condition (equation (16)) and equation (9), we derive the growth 
function of formal employment: 
d b g g b a g g ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( / ) 1 /( ) 1 ( - - - - - - + = - -
· ·
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Equation (6) suggests that if infrastructure depends on public revenues, then the growth rate of 
formal output and infrastructure must be equal: A Y g A A Y Y g = = = / / & & .
13 Thus, taking into 
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From equation (21), we get its equivalent: 
ld - = Y g , where  1
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( 2
0 <







.  (22) 
  Equation  (22)  suggests  that  the  growth  rate  of  mineral-dependent  output  will  be 
proportional  to  the  rate  of  mineral  depletion  δ.  This  mainly  stems  from  the  fact  that  a 
dissipating  mineral  stock  constrains  production  in  the  sector,  reduces  relative  income 
(compared  to  informal  activities)  and  indirectly  reduces  tax  revenues  that  support  local 
infrastructure. 
 
  From equations (19) and (22) we can also derive the growth rate of formal employment in 
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  Equation (23) suggests that employment in the mineral stock decreases over time as the 
mineral stock dissipates.
14 This is intuitive, as a decreasing mineral stock (and thus mineral 
                                                   
13   The result is driven by large by the assumption that the mineral sector dominates the formal economy. An 
alternative taxable sector (such a ‘services’ sector) could reverse the pattern of declining public revenues and  
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revenues) induces formal mineral employment to shift to informal activities. From equation 
(16) one can see that the relative wage in the mineral-dependent sector decreases over time, as 
the sector contracts due to resource dissipation
15. We state this finding as a proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. Production in the mineral-based sector falls in correspondence to a declining 
mineral  stock.  Subsequently  employment  in  mining  (1-γ)  shifts  away  from  mineral-based 
activities and the informal sector expands. 
 
  Furthermore, it is easy to see that output in the mineral-based sector (Y) per worker (1-γ) 























.   
   The decline in mineral reserves reduces mineral revenues and employment opportunities 
in  the  mining  sector.  A  reduced  mineral  stock  deprives  the  mineral-based  sector  of  the 
potential  to  sustain  the  same  level  of  employment.  Mineral  dissipation  results  in  reduced 
revenues in the sector for a given level of employment, decreased public revenues for the 
local government and reduced financial support for maintaining infrastructure. This bears an 
impact on the level of wages and employment in the sector forcing a number of employees to 
seek employment in alternative activities in order to derive their livelihood. In most resource-
                                                                                                                                                               
infrastructure, as long as workers shift their effort towards it rather than informal production (which, being 
unregulated, offers free and easy access to a common property resource).  
14   We should note, that if wages in the formal economy are temporarily lower than revenues per work effort in 
the renewable sector, labour will start moving out of the mineral-dependent sector at a rate faster than –λδ/2 till 
payoffs  in  the  two  sectors  equalize.  During  this  transition,  the  contraction  rate  in  the  mineral-based  sector 
remains higher than –λδ (eq. 22) and steadily converges to that rate as payoffs in the two sectors converge as 
well.  
15   The relative return of work effort the mineral-dependent sector decreases at a rate equal to (1+α)λδ.  
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dependent regions, such a scenario will most likely induce a shift of labour towards informal 
production (e.g. logging and charcoal burning). 
 
  Equation (13) illustrates that the depletion rate of the renewable resource ( X X g X & = ) is 
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  This implies that the stock of the renewable resource also dissipates over time due to the 
continuous entry of former mineral workers, which increases overall work effort and thus harvest 
in the renewable sector.




As the mineral resource stock dissipates and the informal sector expands, a 
continuous  entry  of  new  agents  into  the  renewable  sector  (charcoal  production)  exerts 
simultaneous pressure on the renewable resource base.    
 
 
  Although beyond the scope of the paper, it is worth pointing out that an upward trend in the 
relative price of the renewable resource with respect to the product of the mineral-dependent 
sector  ( X X P P
×
)  will  exacerbate  the  pace  of  contraction  of  the  formal  economy.  The  labour 
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16    In terms of Figure 1, this is demonstrated with an increase in the slope of the harvest curve H(X) over time.  
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which implies a higher rate of contraction for the formal economy. A rising trend for Px (or a 
declining  relative  for  the  mineral  commodity)  is  far  from  a  rare  phenomenon  for  many 
mineral-dependent economies, which have experienced sharp and prolonged fall in mineral 
prices in the past. Cashin et al. (2002) estimate for the 1957-1998 period that the prices of 
mineral commodities such as lead, copper, and nickel have been falling by more than 40% on 
average (with a much smaller increase during booms). Increased competition from new mines 
(especially in Latin America), improved techniques to obtain recycled metals from scrap, and 
deteriorating  ore  grades  have  much  contributed  to  this  pattern  (for  a  recent  elaborate 
discussion on the volatile and generally declining real prices of mineral commodities, see 
Cashin et al. 2002). Schmitz (1979) calculates that the real price of a tonne of copper in 1976 
was more than 30% lower to the price of copper 100 years earlier. 
3.   CONCLUSIONS 
  Our analysis attempts to shed some additional light into the disappointing performance of 
mineral-based economies, a phenomenon often referred to as the “resource curse hypothesis”. 
Mineral-dependent countries such as Zambia, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Liberia and Niger are 
often  deemed  as  prominent  development  failures.  They  all  lack  behind  in  terms  of 
infrastructure,  social  capital  and  educational  standards  even  when  compared  to  resource-
scarce countries of similar welfare level. Recently, there has been an invigorated interest in  
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the  link  between  resource  affluence  and  economic  performance  in  the  economic  growth 
literature.   
  In this paper, we develop a novel theoretical explanation that can contribute to this strand 
of  literature.  We  claim  that  a  stagnated  mining  industry  is  likely  to  have  negative 
repercussions extending beyond the mineral sector and therefore influence the livelihoods of a 
broad array of societal layers. A mining industry in decline, is most likely to offload workers 
to the rest of the economy and also constrain the ability of governemnt authorities to collect 
public revenues and support local infrastructure. It is very plausible that miners will directly 
feel (fully or partially) the impact of a mining industry under recession on their real income 
and seek alternative livelihoods (either deliberately or forcefully). In developing countries a 
lack of alternative formal economic activities implies that such labour surpluses are (at least 
partially)  absorbed  into  informal  sectors  involving  looting  and  exploiting  unprotected 
common resources. An immediate corollary of such labour shifts comprises the degradation of 
environmental services in the surrounding areas and a constraint to accumulate formal public 
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